UNITED
NATIONS

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20 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to our letter dated 21 June 1993 (S/25925), and on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith for your kind attention a letter from Dr. Hussein Suliman Abu Salih, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan, concerning the aggression of the Government of the Republic of Egypt on the Sudanese region of Halaib and the area south of Argin.

I should be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Mohamed Osman YASSIN
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 11 July 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to our letters addressed to you on the subject of the aggression by the Arab Republic of Egypt against the Sudanese region of Halaib, the most recent of which was that of 18 May 1993 (S/25925, annex), we should like hereunder to inform the Council of subsequent developments.

In an attempt to contain the crisis in the bilateral framework, Lieutenant-General Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir, President of the Sudan, and Mr. Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, met on 29 June 1993 in conjunction with the session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity then being held in Cairo. They agreed that the dispute between the two countries must be contained and that the endeavour must be made to resolve it through negotiations. They further agreed that their Ministers for Foreign Affairs should meet to discuss all unresolved issues between the two countries, including the boundary dispute.

At the invitation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, the Ministers' first meeting was held in Cairo from 26 to 30 July 1993. Its objective was to relieve the tension that had arisen in relations between the two countries by ensuring abstention from any action that might increase such tension. At that meeting, the Egyptian side requested that discussion of the boundary dispute be deferred to the Ministers' next meeting, which, it was agreed at that time, was to be held in Khartoum in September 1993.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan accordingly extended an invitation to his Egyptian counterpart to attend a second meeting in Khartoum from 13 to 16 September 1993. However, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs declined because of scheduling difficulties and proposed that the meeting should be held in October 1993 instead.

Sudan then extended an invitation to the Egyptian side for meetings to be held from 14 to 18 October 1993, but Egypt declined and requested another postponement until November or December 1993. Sudan continued to press for the meeting to be held in Khartoum, but the Egyptian side did not even take the trouble to reply to the invitation.

The Egyptian Government has not been content to withhold its response to the invitation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan to hold the meeting between the two parties in Khartoum but has proceeded in a systematic manner not only to consolidate its presence in the disputed Halaib region but also to establish a presence for the first time to the south of latitude 22 degrees north in the Arqin border area near the city of Wadi Halfa on the River Nile. Egypt affirms that this is the dividing line between the two countries, and this is an area that has never been in dispute between them, as is clear from the attached map. The military and administrative violations committed by Egypt are set forth hereunder.

A. Military violations in the Arqin area

1. On 31 July 1993, an Egyptian force of two officers and 23 men entered the village of Arqin. They had with them surveying equipment, and they claimed that they were engaged in a survey of the boundaries. They withdrew from the locality after erecting a sign on which were written the words "Boundaries demarcated in 1981".

2. On the same day, another Egyptian force entered Arqin and raised the Egyptian flag.

3. On 16 August 1993, an Egyptian force penetrated 5 kilometres south of the 22nd parallel, established a camp, raised the Egyptian flag and erected a border sign.

4. On 25 August 1993, the Egyptian force was increased from 20 to 31 persons.

5. On 27 August 1993, the Egyptian forces placed two barrels in a straight line on the east bank of the Nile in front of the home of a Sudanese national and opposite the Egyptian post that they had previously established on the west bank.

6. On 15 and 16 December 1993, an Egyptian military force established two new camps, one to the east and one to the west of Arqin, and Sudanese nationals were prevented from crossing in a northerly direction.

7. On 6 June 1994, an Egyptian aircraft violated Sudanese airspace in the Wadi Halfa area.

B. Military violations in the Halaib area

1. On 2 July 1993, a group of young people from Abu Ramad was on its way to take part in a sports competition on the anniversary of the revolution of national salvation when they were prevented from crossing by the Egyptian forces.

2. On 7 July 1993, the Egyptian forces began to search Sudanese nationals at the barriers set up in and before Abu Ramad and to prevent some of them from passing.

3. On 30 September 1993, two Egyptian aircraft flew over the Muhammad Qawl area inside Sudanese territory and photographed it. On the same day, four Egyptian aircraft were seen in the area of Marsa Rawina.

4. During October 1993, the Egyptian forces commenced construction of a building, which they called the Halaib Electricity Station, 5 kilometres south of Halaib.

5. On 5 November 1993, an Egyptian military aircraft flew over the Shalatin area three times. This was repeated on 21 December 1993. On 6 February 1994 two Egyptian helicopters flew over Sudanese territorial waters, and on 12 February 1994 they flew over Shalatin once again.

6. On 28 November 1993, the Egyptian forces began to conduct stricter searches at the gateway they had erected on the 22nd parallel. They also detained Sudanese commercial vehicles for long hours and harassed the drivers.

7. On 20 December 1993, the Egyptian forces brought pressure to bear on Sudanese tradesmen at the Shalatin market by restricting the supply of drinking water, and they accused them of cooperating with the Sudanese Government.

8. On 21 January 1994, an Egyptian naval vessel was seen moored off the shore of Halaib Island. During the same day, an Egyptian warship and destroyer approached and moored off Halaib.

9. On 23 January 1994, the Egyptian forces reinforced their presence in the western sector to the north of Halaib and dug a defensive position there.

They also detained a number of Sudanese and, at the same time, protested at the flying of the Sudanese flag in the area.

10. On 24 January 1994, another naval vessel, named Timsah II, appeared in the seaward approaches to Halaib.

11. On the same day, the Egyptian forces arrested nine Sudanese who were people from the Nuba mountains. They were released after interrogation.

12. On 29 January 1994, the Egyptian forces arrested the Sudanese national Isma'il al-Radi and held him for a number of days.

13. On 30 January 1994, the Egyptian forces carried out training manoeuvres in the Halaib triangle. They installed fortifications and concrete bunkers along the 22nd parallel.

14. On 31 January 1994, the Egyptian forces halted all Sudanese vehicles and prohibited them from entering and leaving the Halaib triangle.

15. On the same day, when Sudanese citizens and officials were returning from Marsa Oseif after welcoming Lieutenant-General Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir, President of the Republic, on his visit there, the Egyptian forces detained them and prevented them from passing through the gateway on the 22nd parallel. The Egyptian forces took up position in trenches at the crossing, pointing their weapons at Sudanese citizens.

16. On 5 February 1994, the Egyptian forces in the Shalatin area conducted a tactical exercise and held manoeuvres in which armour and helicopters took part.

17. On 1 May 1994, the Egyptian forces carried out reconnaissance around Gebel Elba in the Halaib area.

18. On 3 May 1994, the Egyptian forces conducted naval manoeuvres close to Marsa Halaib.

19. On 14 May 1994, the Egyptian forces helped to smuggle a herd of 180 sheep into Egyptian territory and facilitated the smuggling of two truckloads of Sudanese mangoes.

20. On 17 May 1994, the Egyptian forces conducted firing exercises in the Halaib area, and they detained a Sudanese truck carrying a load of cement to Halaib.

21. On 30 May 1994, the Egyptian forces detained four Sudanese civilians, two customs officers and a tanker truck on the pretext of searching them.

22. On 7 June 1994, the Egyptian forces conducted firing exercises with miscellaneous weapons to the south of Gebel Alamat inside the Halaib triangle. They also made earth embankments in the area.

C. Administrative and press violations

1. On 12 November 1993, Mr. Yousuf Wali, Egyptian Minister of Agriculture, issued a decree establishing a commission for the development of the Halaib and Shalatin region in the agriculture and land-reclamation domain.

2. On 22 November 1993, the Local Council of the Egyptian Red Sea Province moved its place of meeting, for the first time, from the provincial capital of Ghardaqah to Shalatin.

3. On 27 November 1993, Major-General Abd al-Hamid Siraj al-Din, Mayor of Shalatin, announced that a new road was being built in the Halaib and Shalatin area at a cost of 75 million Egyptian pounds. He added that one hundred houses had been distributed among the inhabitants and that telephone communications had been provided. He further stated that the Governor, Yusri al-Shami, had opened a number of schools in the area and had laid the foundation stone for a youth centre in Shalatin, to be built at a cost of 85,000 Egyptian pounds, to serve the young people of the Halaib triangle and Shalatin.

4. At the end of November 1993, the Egyptian Minister of Works announced that a high commission would be established to protect the Egyptian shoreline all the way from Halaib to Salum.

5. On 13 December 1993, the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum extended by three months the deadline for oil companies to complete the studies in the Halaib and Shalatin region necessary to obtain the approval of Parliament for the granting of an exploration concession.

6. On 5 January 1994, the Egyptian authorities brought seven fishing boats from the north to Abu Ramad and they were distributed by Egyptian intelligence authorities to local residents. A further eight boats were brought in by the Egyptian authorities on 3 February 1994.

7. On 6 January 1994, the official Egyptian newspapers reported that the Egyptian Electricity Corporation had completed the construction and equipment of three new electricity stations, at Halaib, Shalatin and Abu Ramad.

8. On 24 January 1994, the official newspaper Al-Ahram carried an announcement by the Minister of Housing that it had been decided to establish an industrial complex in the Halaib-Shalatin-Abu Ramad triangle and that a full-scale housing development plan had been drawn up for the area.

9. On 24 February 1994, the official newspaper Al-Ahram reported that the Egyptian Government had allocated a sum of 12 million Egyptian pounds for the expansion of education in the Halaib triangle by building four boarding and technical schools and facilities for teachers.

10. On 8 February 1994, the Legislative Committee of the Egyptian People's Assembly approved the amendment of the People's Assembly Act to establish a new electoral constituency of Halaib and Shalatin.

11. On 22 March 1994, the official newspaper Al-Akhbar reported that the Egyptian Minister of Transport and Communications would open the first stage of the 305-kilometre-long Barnis-Shalatin-Halaib road.

12. On 23 March 1994, the official newspaper Al-Jumhuriyah reported that the Egyptian Minister of Health had allocated the sum of 3 million Egyptian pounds for the construction of a village hospital at Shalatin and of health units at Abu Ramad and Halaib.

13. On 27 March 1994, the newspaper Al-Wafd reported that two water desalination plants had been built in the town of Shalatin.

14. On the same day, the newspaper Al-Akhbar reported that an urban development plan was currently being drawn up for the towns of Barnis, Halaib and Shalatin. It went on to state that Major-General Abd al-Mun'im Sa'id, Governor of Red Sea Province, had announced that the new plan included the allocation of 2.7 million Egyptian pounds for the construction of dams in the area for the retention of rainwater. He further stated that one thousand houses had been built in the town of Halaib for the resettlement of Bedouin.

15. On 30 March 1994, the Egyptian Minister of Culture announced that a committee of senior experts in his Ministry had elaborated an integrated programme of cultural activity for the Halaib-Shalatin-Abu Ramad area.

16. On 4 April 1994, the official newspaper Al-Akhbar reported that the Egyptian Minister of Housing would visit the Halaib-Shalatin-Abu Ramad area to inspect the construction of residential units and of water, sanitation and road projects.

17. On 14 May 1994, the newspaper Al-Alam al-Yawm, which is published in Egypt, reported that the Egyptian Ministry of Transport had engaged four Egyptian companies to increase the capacity of the Barnis-Halaib road.

You have perhaps noted from the foregoing review of developments that while the Egyptian Government has not sent a delegation to Khartoum for continued dialogue on the resolution of differences, as had been agreed by the two countries, it is adopting numerous and systematic measures to wage flagrant aggression against territory that Egypt does not own in law or in fact. This is confirmed by the demographic and geographical situation and by the agreements concluded on the Halaib region, the most recent of which is that signed by the Under-Secretaries at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries in October 1992 affirming that Halaib is in dispute. The matter has not stopped there, but the Egyptian Government has proceeded to go beyond the dispute concerning Halaib and has made an incursion into the Arqin area south of the 22nd parallel, which has never been an area in dispute between the two countries. This fact reflects and confirms the aggressive, expansionist and provocative nature of the Government of Egypt's policy.

The failure of the Egyptian Government to respond to the call for dialogue and for the resumption of negotiations and its adoption at the same time of far-reaching military, legislative and administrative measures in Sudanese territory, indicate that it does not want to settle the dispute by peaceful means and on a bilateral basis. The Government of the Sudan, which continues to exercise forbearance and self-restraint in its regard for the historical relations of brotherliness between the two countries, warns that a continuation of these aggressive measures may lead to armed confrontation between the two countries, which may threaten security and peace in the region. We therefore renew our call to the Security Council to meet its responsibilities in full by urging the Egyptian Government:

1. To rescind the military and administrative measures it has taken in the Halaib area and south of Arqin;

2. To make an immediate start on resolving the dispute through negotiations based on the previous agreement between the two countries and in accordance with Article 33, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that "The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means".

In this context, the Government of the Sudan would like to reaffirm its concern that the dispute between the two countries be settled by peaceful means. As before, it continues to express its complete readiness to receive the Egyptian side in Khartoum in order to resume negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful, speedy and comprehensive solution in the framework of the bilateral relations between the two countries. At the same time, the Government of the Sudan declares its readiness to settle this dispute by any of the means for the peaceful settlement of disputes set forth in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, including arbitration or judicial settlement through the International Court of Justice.

Lastly, Mr. President, we repeat our call to the Council to assume the role assigned to it in the maintenance of peace and security in an area whose people have long lived in peace and stability.

(Signed) Hussein Suliman ABU SALIH
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of the Sudan


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Sudanese Egyptian border
Faras
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UNITED
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20 July 1994

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 21 January-20 July 1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 895 (1994) of 28 January 1994, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months, until 31 July 1994. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, 1/ approved by the Council in its resolution 426 (1978) and called upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE

2. As of July 1994, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Military personnel

Fiji	HQ UNIFIL	11	
	Infantry battalion	598	
	Force Mobile Reserve	34	
	Military police	8	651

Finland	HQ UNIFIL	13	
	Infantry battalion	482	
	Force Mobile Reserve	20	
	Military police	9	524
France	HQ UNIFIL	14	
	Composite battalion (maintenance company, defence company, armoured escort company)	416	
	Military police	10	
	Camp command	1	441
Ghana	HQ UNIFIL	22	
	Infantry battalion (including engineer company)	721	
	Force Mobile Reserve	36	
	Military police	7	
	Camp command	2	788
Ireland	HQ UNIFIL	33	
	Infantry battalion	585	
	Camp command	30	
	Force Mobile Reserve	17	
	Military police	12	677
Italy	HQ UNIFIL	5	
	Helicopter unit	37	42
Nepal	HQ UNIFIL	11	
	Infantry battalion	678	
	Force Mobile Reserve	29	
	Military police	5	723
Norway	HQ UNIFIL	23	
	Infantry battalion	594	
	Maintenance company	166	
	Force Mobile Reserve	32	
	Military police	16	831
Poland	HQ UNIFIL	17	
	Logistic battalion	334	
	Engineer company	131	
	Medical unit	71	
	Force Mobile Reserve	4	
	Military police	10	567
	Total UNIFIL		5 244

The deployment of UNIFIL is shown on the map attached to this report.

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3. Major-General Trond Furuhovde of Norway continued as Force Commander.

4. Fifty-nine military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assisted UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks. These unarmed officers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and are under the operational control of the Force Commander of UNIFIL. They man the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line. They also operate five mobile teams in that part of the area of operation which is controlled by Israel.

5. Logistic support for UNIFIL was provided by the Polish logistic battalion, which replaced the Swedish logistic battalion with effect from 6 April, as well as elements of the French composite battalion, the Norwegian maintenance company, the Polish engineer company, the Ghanaian engineer company, the Polish medical unit, the Italian helicopter unit and by some sections of the civilian staff, especially in the areas of communications and vehicle maintenance. Currently, UNIFIL employs 528 civilian staff, of whom 142 are recruited internationally and 386 locally.

6. The Force Mobile Reserve, a composite mechanized company, currently consisting of elements from seven contingents (Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Norway and Poland), reinforced UNIFIL's battalions when serious incidents occurred and during rotations. The French armoured company also reinforced the battalions as required and conducted patrols within the UNIFIL area.

7. I regret to report that two Fijian soldiers died as a result of hostile firing and that one Nepalese officer died as a result of a vehicle accident. In addition, a Fijian soldier and a Polish officer died of natural causes. Eight others suffered injuries as a result of firing or explosions. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 200 military members of the Force have died, 76 as a result of firing or mine or bomb explosions, 82 in accidents and 42 from other causes. There have been 307 military members wounded by firing or by mine or bomb explosions.

8. UNIFIL continued to have difficulties in meeting its requirements of land and premises for its checkpoints, observation posts and other installations. The main reason for this is that, since 1987, the Government of Lebanon has failed to reimburse the owners of the properties being used by UNIFIL. In August 1993, the Lebanese authorities completed a survey of the properties used by UNIFIL, with a view to determining the level of reimbursement. However, to date no payments have been made to the owners.

9. UNIFIL maintained close contact and cooperation with the Lebanese authorities on all matters of mutual concern. Those authorities rendered assistance to UNIFIL in connection with the rotation of troops through Beirut and other logistic activities. Liaison and communications with the Lebanese army were further improved. Lebanese army liaison officers have been particularly helpful in defusing confrontations with armed elements. In February, the Lebanese army established two permanent checkpoints inside the UNIFIL area of deployment for the purpose of controlling the influx of goods into the country. One checkpoint was established on the coastal road near Al Mansuri in the Fijian battalion sector, and the second south of Tibnin in the

Irish battalion sector. The gendarmerie and customs authorities from time to time set up temporary checkpoints within UNIFIL's area of deployment for the same purpose. The Force continued to cooperate with the Lebanese gendarmerie on matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order.

III. SITUATION IN THE UNIFIL AREA OF OPERATION

10. Israel continued to control in southern Lebanon an area manned by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army". The boundaries of the Israeli-controlled area (ICA) have not been clearly defined but are determined de facto by the forward positions of IDF/DFF. It includes territory adjacent to the armistice demarcation line, parts of the Fijian, Nepalese, Irish, Ghanaian and Finnish battalion sectors and the entire Norwegian battalion sector, as well as sizeable areas to the north of UNIFIL's area of operation. Within the area of operation, IDF and DFF maintained 67 military positions, as shown on the attached map. The map also indicates where ICA extends beyond the limits of UNIFIL's area of operation.

11. UNIFIL observed 55 operations against IDF/DFF by armed elements who have proclaimed their resistance against Israeli occupation (2 in the latter part of January, 12 in February, 6 in March, 9 in April, 4 in May, 14 in June and 8 in the first half of July). There were also numerous reports of attacks against IDF/DFF positions north of the Litani river. In their operations, the armed elements employed roadside bombs, rockets, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles. There were six reported incidents of rocket firing into northern Israel.

12. IDF/DFF continued their own attacks and retaliatory firing against armed elements employing artillery, mortars, tanks and aircraft. There were a number of cases of firing at towns and villages, causing casualties among the inhabitants. UNIFIL recorded some 10,500 artillery, mortar and tank rounds fired by IDF/DFF.

13. During the period under review, there were 166 instances of firing by IDF/DFF at or close to UNIFIL positions and personnel. Such firing has been the subject of repeated protests to the Israeli authorities.

14. UNIFIL continued to oppose attempts by armed elements to use its area for hostile purposes. At times, this led to friction at UNIFIL's checkpoints, followed by harassment and threats directed at the members of the Force. Such cases were generally resolved through negotiations.

15. A serious incident occurred on 3 June 1994, when a UNIFIL patrol encountered armed members of Hezbollah in the Fijian battalion sector. An exchange of fire ensued in which one Fijian soldier was seriously injured; he died two days later. It is believed that one of the armed elements was killed in that incident. Following that clash, a number of Fijian positions and the camp of the Force Mobile Reserve came under intense fire from armed elements, resulting in injuries to two other Fijian soldiers. In the evening of the same day, two Fijian soldiers manning a checkpoint came under fire from a passing vehicle; one was killed and the other injured. The Lebanese authorities have

placed in custody one individual suspected of having been involved in that attack and are continuing their investigations. The situation in the Fijian battalion sector was contained with the assistance of the Lebanese army, both locally and in Beirut.

16. On 23 June, armed elements in the vicinity of Kafra in the Nepalese battalion sector fired a rocket-propelled grenade and three machine-gun bursts close to a UNIFIL helicopter.

17. As in the past, UNIFIL detonated mines, roadside bombs and unexploded remnants of war and dismantled ordnance of various types in the area of deployment. A total of 111 controlled explosions were carried out.

18. Within ICA, Israel maintained, in addition to the de facto forces, a civil administration and a security service. Movement between ICA and the rest of Lebanon was strictly controlled and ICA remained economically dependent on Israel. An estimated 3,000 jobs in Israel were held by Lebanese from ICA. Access to such jobs was controlled by DFF and the security services.

19. A serious incident took place in ICA on 11/12 March when a group of Palestinian armed elements were discovered in the Norwegian battalion sector by members of the security service of DFF. In the ensuing confrontation one member of the group was shot and killed after he had surrendered.

20. UNIFIL again received reports of forced recruitment to DFF, including the recruitment of persons under the age of 18 years. In March, Lebanese civilians made representations to UNIFIL concerning the expulsion of three men from their village in ICA, on the grounds that their sons had refused to serve in DFF. The expulsions were protested to the Israeli authorities. The three expellees have recently returned to their homes.

21. UNIFIL continued to extend humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in its area, to the extent possible within available resources. UNIFIL cooperated closely on these matters with the Lebanese authorities, the Coordinator of the United Nations Programme of Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon, the United Nations Development Programme and other United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Lebanon, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations. UNIFIL also continued its cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) in their activities to repair schools, community halls and other public buildings destroyed or damaged during the Israeli bombardment of July 1993. UNIFIL provided assistance to the local population in the form of medical supplies, water, clothes, blankets, food, fuel, electricity, engineering work and repairs to buildings damaged as a result of firing. It also escorted farmers to enable them to work fields within range of IDF/DFF positions. In addition, water projects, equipment or services for schools and gifts of supplies to social services and needy people were provided from resources made available by troop-contributing Governments. UNIFIL medical centres and mobile teams provided care to an average of almost 3,000 civilian patients per month. A field dental programme was also provided, treating approximately 500 patients a month. On their own initiative UNIFIL personnel contributed $6,400 towards humanitarian work.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

22. By its resolution 48/254 of 26 May 1994, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the operation of UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed $11,857,000 gross ($11,474,500 net) per month for a period of up to six months beginning 1 August 1994, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 895 (1994). In that event, the costs to the United Nations of maintaining the Force would be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 48/254, assuming continuation of the Force's current strength and responsibilities.

23. As of 30 June 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account for the mandate periods up to 31 July 1994 amounted to $254.2 million.

V. OBSERVATIONS

24. During the last six months, the situation in southern Lebanon continued to be tense and volatile. Attacks by armed elements against Israeli and associated military forces on Lebanese territory continued. There were also a few incidents of rockets being fired into northern Israel. For their part, IDF/DFF responded to attacks with heavy shelling, on a number of occasions causing casualties among the civilian population. In recent weeks, the Israeli forces have increasingly taken the initiative in the fighting, including air raids against targets deep inside Lebanese territory.

25. UNIFIL continued, to the best of its ability, to limit the conflict to the extent possible and to protect the inhabitants from the effects of the violence. The Force stepped up its patrols throughout its area of deployment in order to provide protection both within the villages and to farmers working in the fields. On a few occasions, UNIFIL was itself the target of violence. I must stress once again to all concerned their obligation to respect UNIFIL's international and impartial status.

26. Notwithstanding the Security Council's repeated calls for its withdrawal, Israel has maintained its occupation of parts of southern Lebanon and its general attitude to the situation in the area and to UNIFIL's mandate remains as described in previous reports (see S/1994/62, para. 26).

27. For its part, the Government of Lebanon contrasts the progress made in reconstruction and rehabilitation elsewhere in the country with Israel's continuing occupation in the south. It considers this to be the major obstacle to national recovery and emphasizes that the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) is the only way to stop the violence in southern Lebanon. Lebanon's position is described in detail in a letter that the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to me on 13 July 1994 (S/1994/826), in which he informed me of his Government's decision to request the Security Council to extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months.

28. As is evident from the present report, the situation in southern Lebanon has remained essentially unchanged and UNIFIL continues to be prevented from fulfilling its mandate. Nevertheless, within the limits imposed on it by the circumstances, the Force's contribution to stability and the protection it is able to afford the population in the area where it is deployed remain important. I therefore recommend that the Security Council accept the Lebanese Government's request and extend UNIFIL's mandate for another period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1995.

29. In my last report (S/1994/62) I expressed the hope that at the end of the present mandate period the ongoing peace talks would have made sufficient progress to justify a further reduction in UNIFIL's strength. Regrettably, there has been no visible progress in the talks. Nevertheless, I am compelled for other reasons to give the most serious consideration to the possibility of a reduction. Despite all appeals to Member States to pay their assessments promptly and to clear their arrears, the funds available in the Force's accounts are barely sufficient to cover three weeks' expenses and the accumulated shortfall in assessed contributions in respect of UNIFIL has now reached a total of $254.2 million. The shortfall in assessed contributions is a long-term problem and, since most of the Force's expenditures are directly or indirectly related to personnel, it can be ameliorated only by a reduction in strength which would, in turn, affect the activities of the Force. I have accordingly initiated a study to determine how UNIFIL could perform its essential functions in such circumstances.

30. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major-General Trond Furuhovde, the Force Commander, and to all the men and women under his command for the manner in which they have carried out their difficult and often dangerous task. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations. I also pay tribute to the memory of those members of the Force who have given their lives in the cause of peace.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978, document S/12611.

وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
في شهر تموز/يوليه ١٩٩٤
1994年7月联黎部队的部署情形
UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JULY 1994
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE JUILLET 1994
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ИЮЛЬ 1994 ГОДА
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN JULIO DE 1994
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
SUR (TYRE)
TRANSIT BASE
FINBATT
GHANBATT
BN HQ
POLAND
GHANA
FMR
FIJIBATT
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IRISHBAT
UNIFIL HQ
POLLOG
FRENCHLOG
ITALAIR
COMPOSITE MP COY
POLMEDCOY
OGL
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LAB (OGL)
HIN (OGL)
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MAP NO. 3000 Rev. 36 UNITED NATIONS
JULY 1994



مركز مراقبة
观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación

نقطة تفتيش
检查站
Check point
Point de contrôle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control

قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base

موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional

حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte

الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza

وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa

موقع لقوات الدفاع الاسرائيلية و/أو "جيش جنوب لبنان"
以色列国防军和(或)"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejercito del Líbano meridional"

المساحة التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الاسرائيلية من منطقة عمل قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况
Approximate area under Israeli control in UNIFIL area of operation
Périmètre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israélien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL
Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля
Area aproximada bajo control israelí dentro de la zone de operaciones de la Fuerza

الامتداد الشمالي للمنطقة التي تسيطر عليها اسرائيل
以色列控制地区向北延伸部分
Northward extension of Israeli controlled area
Extension vers le nord de la zone contrôlée par Israel
Северная часть территории, контролируемой Израилем
Extensión septentrional de la zona controlada por Israel

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1994/857
21 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 849 (1993) of 9 July 1993, 854 (1993) of 6 August 1993, 858 (1993) of 24 August 1993, 876 (1993) of 19 October 1993, 881 (1993) of 4 November 1993, 892 (1993) of 22 December 1993, 896 (1994) of 31 January 1994, 906 (1994) of 25 March 1994 and 934 (1994) of 30 June 1994,

Recalling the letter of 16 June 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General (S/1994/714),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 12 July 1994 (S/1994/818 and Add.1),

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, and the right of all refugees and displaced persons affected by the conflict to return to their homes in secure conditions, in accordance with international law and as set out in the Quadripartite Agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons (S/1994/397, annex II), signed in Moscow on 4 April 1994,

Welcoming the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 (S/1994/583),

Recognizing the importance of consistent and full compliance with the Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict (S/1994/397, annex I) and the Quadripartite Agreement,

Stressing the crucial importance of progress in the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and with the assistance of the Russian Federation as facilitator and with the participation of representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, including on the political status of Abkhazia, respecting fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, based on the principles set out in its previous resolutions,

Stressing also that this progress would allow the Council to reconsider the possible establishment of a peace-keeping force in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, as proposed in the letter of 7 September 1993 from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia and of the Russian Federation to the Secretary-General (S/26478),

Stressing further the need to prevent any resumption of hostilities in the area,

Deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation, and the dangers which could arise within the region if the large numbers of refugees and displaced persons are not able to return to their homes in secure conditions,

Taking note of the address of the Head of State of the Republic of Georgia of 16 May 1994, and that of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia of 15 May 1994, to the Council of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and recognizing that the deployment of a CIS peace-keeping force to the area is predicated upon the request and consent of the parties to the conflict,

Noting the statements in the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Secretary-General of 21 June 1994 (S/1994/732, annex) concerning the mandate of the CIS peace-keeping force and its duration,

Noting with satisfaction the readiness of the Russian Federation to continue to inform the members of the Security Council on the activities of the CIS peace-keeping force,

Welcoming the closer cooperation and coordination envisaged between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, in particular as regards their efforts to achieve a comprehensive political settlement in the Republic of Georgia,

Underlining the importance of the relevant provisions of the documents of the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE of 1992 (S/24370) and of the ministerial meeting of the CSCE held in Rome on 30 November and 1 December 1993 (S/26843), including those concerning peace-keeping activities in the CSCE area,

Noting the assurances given by the parties and the representatives of the CIS peace-keeping force concerning the full freedom of movement for the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in the performance of its mandate, both within the zone of operations of the CIS peace-keeping force and in other relevant parts of the territory of the Republic of Georgia,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 12 July 1994;

2. Calls upon the parties to intensify their efforts to achieve an early and comprehensive political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations with the assistance of the Russian Federation as facilitator and with the participation of representatives of the CSCE, and welcomes the wish of the parties to see the United Nations continue to be actively involved in the pursuit of a political settlement;

3. Commends the efforts of the members of the CIS directed towards the maintenance of a cease-fire in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, and the promotion of the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in accordance with the Agreement signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 in full cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement;

4. Welcomes the contribution made by the Russian Federation, and indications of further contributions from other members of the CIS, of a peace-keeping force, in response to the request of the parties, pursuant to the 14 May Agreement, in coordination with UNOMIG on the basis of the arrangements described in the Secretary-General's report of 12 July 1994, and in accordance with the established principles and practices of the United Nations;

5. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to increase the strength of UNOMIG, as required, up to 136 military observers with appropriate civilian support staff;

6. Decides also that the mandate of an expanded UNOMIG, based upon the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report, shall be as follows:

(a) To monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994;

(b) To observe the operation of the CIS peace-keeping force within the framework of the implementation of the Agreement;

(c) To verify, through observation and patrolling, that troops of the parties do not remain in or re-enter the security zone and that heavy military equipment does not remain or is not reintroduced in the security zone or the restricted weapons zone;

(d) To monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment withdrawn from the security zone and the restricted weapons zone in cooperation with the CIS peace-keeping force as appropriate;

(e) To monitor the withdrawal of troops of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori valley to places beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia;

(f) To patrol regularly the Kodori valley;

(g) To investigate, at the request of either party or the CIS peace-keeping force or on its own initiative, reported or alleged violations of the Agreement and tc attempt to resolve or contribute to the resolution of such incidents;

(h) To report regularly to the Secretary-General within its mandate, in particular on the implementation of the Agreement, any violations and their investigation by UNOMIG, as well as other relevant developments;

(i) To maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperate with the CIS peace-keeping force and, by its presence in the area, to contribute to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons;

7. Notes the Secretary-General's intention to write to the Chairman of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS on the respective roles and responsibilities of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force and requests the Secretary-General to establish an appropriate arrangement to that effect, and requests the commanders of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force to conclude and implement the appropriate arrangements on the ground described in the Secretary-General's report of 12 July 1994 (S/1994/818) for coordination and cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force in the implementation of their respective tasks;

8. Calls upon the parties to the conflict to extend full support, necessary protection and freedom of movement to UNOMIG in the performance of its mandate both within the zone of operations of the CIS peace-keeping force and in other relevant parts of the territory of the Republic of Georgia for it to fulfil its mandate, and requests that a status of mission agreement with the Government of the Republic of Georgia and necessary arrangements with the Abkhaz authorities be concluded without delay;

9. Reaffirms its support for the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in secure conditions, in accordance with international law and as set out in the Quadripartite Agreement, calls upon the parties to honour the commitments they have already made in this regard and to accelerate the process as far as possible, and requests UNHCR to give its full assistance to the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement on the return of refugees and displaced persons;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a voluntary fund for contributions in support of the implementation of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 and/or for humanitarian aspects including demining, as specified by the donors, which will in particular facilitate the implementation of UNOMIG's mandate, and encourages Member States to contribute thereto;

11. Decides on this basis to extend the mandate of UNOMIG to 13 January 1995;

12. Requests also the Secretary-General to report within three months of the adoption of this resolution on the situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, and on the implementation of all aspects of the above-mentioned agreements;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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General Assembly
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A/48/971
S/1994/858
21 July 1994

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 54
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 20 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey's military Air Force, which occurred on 3 and 6 June 1994 and were recorded as follows:

(a) From 1037 until 1045 hours on 3 June 1994 two Turkish Air Force fighters intruded in the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia at between 28,000 and 30,000 feet;

(b) From 1052 until 1104 hours on 6 June 1994 two Turkish Air Force fighters intruded in the FIR of Nicosia at 25,000 feet.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus I wish to protest these new violations of the airspace of the Republic, and, once again, to point out that these repeated aggressive actions violate the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council on the question of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 54, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alecos SHAMBOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

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UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/48/972
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21 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 54
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 21 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention and to protest strongly over recent intransigent statements by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, and over a series of new provocative activities and condemnable demonstrations staged by the legally invalid secessionist entity in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus as follows:

1. Speaking over the illegal Bayrak radio and the Ankara TRT Television Network on 18 and 19 July 1994, respectively, Mr. Denktash stated that:

> "We have no choice but to form, without losing time, a kind of integration with Turkey, in matters of foreign affairs and defence ... It is meaningless to continue with the negotiations ... A special defence agreement with Turkey, a sort of integration, which also holds true for foreign affairs should be pursued." (Ankara TRT Television Network, 18 July 1994)

He also said that:

> "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will do everything in its power to complete its integration with Turkey." ("Bayrak", 19 July 1994)

Needless to stress that the demonstration of such a provocative attitude, especially at a time that the Security Council is expected to decide on its future course of action in addressing the substance of the Cyprus problem, aims at rendering ineffective ab initio the contemplated strengthening of your mandate and efforts to find ways of approaching the problem in a manner that will yield results. Moreover, the above statements reveal, yet again, the real Turkish objectives aiming at the annexation, as a first step, of the occupied part of Cyprus to Turkey.

2. On 19 July 1994, the Turkish occupation regime staged a violent demonstration in the occupied area of Nicosia, adjacent to the Ayios Kassianos quarter, in an effort to disrupt a solemn ceremony for the missing persons in Cyprus organized by Greek Cypriot women and other relatives of the missing persons on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Turkish invasion. The solemn ceremony was held near the buffer zone dividing both the island and its capital Nocosia, the last remaining occupied divided city in Europe. A total of 1,619 Greek Cypriots and others have been missing since the Turkish invasion of July 1974.

The violent Turkish demonstrators on the other side of the buffer zone used loud music, speakers and inflammatory slogans in an attempt to disrupt the ceremony and provoke the participants. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus condemns such inhumane acts of disrespect against the relatives and families of missing persons and emphasizes that the continuation of this purely humanitarian problem constitutes an affront to the international community in disregard of the numerous United Nations General Assembly resolutions on the missing persons of Cyprus. It is our firm belief that every possible influence must be exercised on the Turkish side to persuade them to cooperate sincerely in the effective investigation of the fate of the missing persons in Cyprus.

3. In another outburst of condemnable activities, organized by the occupation regime on 19 July 1994, about 2,500 Turkish demonstrators, in violation of the status of Famagusta, crossed into and occupied for several hours the Ayios Memnon quarter of the fenced area of Varosha. The demonstrators through various slogans not only alleged that the fenced area belonged to them, but also violently objected to its placement under United Nations administration as provided for in your proposals on confidence-building measures.

In protesting thee violent activities, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus particularly recalls that such actions clearly violate the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha and contravene the mandatory provisions of resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 of the Security Council, which "considers attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of that area to the administration of the United Nations". I cannot but recall, in this respect, that as has often been stated in your reports to the Security Council "the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha" (para. 22 of your latest report, S/1994/680, of 7 June 1994).

It is obvious that all the above provocative statements and illegal activities constitute yet another tangible and vivid manifestation of the lack of political will, as stated in your report of 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629, para. 53), on the part of the Turkish side and the occupying power to cooperate in the search for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. It is our earnest hope that the United Nations would act decisively at this crucial juncture with a view to foiling any attempts by the Turkish side to flout the United Nations and continue defying its resolutions. It is only through such resolute action that the road will

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20 July 1994

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The President of the Security Council has the honour to transmit to the Council members the attached communication from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

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/...

Annex

Letter dated 11 July 1994 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the Security Council, a Joint Statement which was issued at the conclusion of talks held in Baghdad on 4 and 5 July 1994 between representatives of the Government of Iraq, on the one hand, and representatives of the Special Commission, established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the other.

It will be recalled that, on 18 March 1994, I promised to provide the Council, in connection with its review in July 1994 under paragraphs 21 and 28 of resolution 687 (1991), with a full account of the stage which has been reached in the implementation of paragraphs 8 to 13 of the same resolution, insofar as they fall within the areas of responsibility of the Special Commission. I am ready to provide this account orally to the Council at such time as is convenient to it. However, it might be of assistance to also give to the Council a brief written summary where matters now stand in advance of such an oral account.

As regards the first responsibility of the Special Commission, to identify and to destroy or otherwise to dispose of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the capabilities for their production, as defined in paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991), the situation, in the absence of new and unexpected disclosures, is as follows:

(a) declared or otherwise identified chemical weapons, precursors and means for their production have been destroyed;

(b) declared biological research facilities have been eliminated and biological strains of concern to the Commission have been disposed of;

(c) the Commission now believes that it has a credible accounting for all of Iraq's missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and that such missiles remaining in Iraq after the termination of hostilities have been destroyed. Iraq's programme to develop a two-stage, long-range ballistic missile has been terminated.

A full understanding of all aspects of Iraq's past programmes in the above areas should, with the assistance of Member States, be mapped out in the near future. Had Iraq placed the relevant documentation on its past programmes at the disposal of the Commission this could already have been the case. However, in the light of Iraq's insistence that such documentation has been destroyed, it has been necessary to resort to other and more time-consuming procedures to verify Iraq's accounts of its past programmes. The Special Commission hopes to be able to report to the Council shortly that the full accounting of Iraq's past programmes, which the Council requires, has been arrived at.

The second of the responsibilities of the Special Commission and of the IAEA is to undertake ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items proscribed by paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 of resolution 687 (1991).

It is now a year since, in July 1993, Iraq indicated (S/26127), during the course of a visit that I paid to Baghdad, that it was prepared to comply with the provisions of the plans of ongoing monitoring and verification as contained in resolution 715 (1991). This indication represented a significant reversal of position by Iraq which had previously attempted to block any efforts by the Special Commission to introduce elements of ongoing monitoring of Iraq's dual-capable capabilities. Formal confirmation came, on 26 November 1993, in a communication from Iraq to the President of the Council (S/26811, annex), in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs recorded that "the Government of Iraq has decided to accept the obligations set forth in resolution 715 (1991) and to comply with the provisions of the plans for monitoring and verification as set forth therein."

Since the above developments, Iraq has extended its full cooperation in putting ongoing monitoring and verification in place in the areas coming within the responsibilities of the Special Commission. In January 1994, Iraq provided its first formal declarations under the monitoring plan, thus permitting the Commission to commence arrangements for monitoring each facility in the manner deemed most appropriate by the Commission. The progress which has been made since that time in putting the monitoring system into place in all areas, including the nuclear one, are detailed in the attached Joint Statement.

One major element in the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification which remains to be established is the mechanism for export/import control. A joint Special Commission/IAEA proposal for such a mechanism is now before the Sanctions Committee, as paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) requires all three bodies to develop such a mechanism in cooperation for submission to the Council. It is hoped that the Committee's agreement will shortly be forthcoming. The proposal will then be put to the Council for its approval.

With a proven operational monitoring and verification system, including the export/import mechanism, the Commission and the IAEA believe that an effective and sustainable régime meeting the requirements of the Security Council will have been established. This will be reinforced by the continuing right of the Commission and the IAEA - a continuing right which has been acknowledged by Iraq - to conduct no-notice inspections under Security Council resolutions in conjunction with the monitoring régime. The Commission and the IAEA will report immediately to the Council when, in their view, this effective and sustainable régime is in place. The key element will be the continuing cooperation of Iraq.

I shall be happy to elaborate further on the above account in my oral presentation to the Council.

(Signed) Rolf EKÉUS
Executive Chairman
Office of the Special Commission

Enclosure

JOINT STATEMENT

1. On 4 and 5 July 1994, high-level talks were held in Baghdad by mutual agreement between a delegation from the Government of Iraq, led by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, on the one hand and, on the other, a delegation from the Special Commission, led by its Executive Chairman, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), led by its Action Team Leader, Professor Maurizio Zifferero. The purpose of the discussions was to review the progress made by both sides in the implementation of paragraphs 8 to 13 of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other related Security Council resolutions.

2. Discussion focused upon respective assessments of the stages which have been reached in connection with the two principal responsibilities of the Special Commission and the IAEA: the identification and destruction or rendering harmless of Iraq's capabilities for and weapons of mass destruction; and the putting in place and operation of an effective system of monitoring and verification as approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991). Members of the Security Council have expressed interest in hearing the outcome of this review before commencing their forthcoming deliberations in July 1994.

3. The Special Commission and the IAEA agreed that the first of these tasks was almost complete, with the destruction and rendering harmless of declared and otherwise identified prohibited weapons and capabilities. It was agreed that the Commission, the IAEA and Iraq would endeavour, as soon as possible, to complete this task. What remained would be addressed at the earliest opportunity through further technical discussion and independent verification.

4. On the second of the tasks indicated above, the Commission, the IAEA and Iraq noted with great satisfaction that, through their best endeavours and the high degree of cooperation achieved, substantial progress had been made in all the areas covered by the system for ongoing monitoring and verification. The Commission indicated that baseline inspections and monitoring protocols in the missile area had been completed, as had the tagging of Iraq's remaining shorter-range missiles. Tagging equipment to be monitored was under way. In the chemical area, monitoring protocols had been completed for the principal facilities directly involved. Similar protocols for remaining facilities, primarily oil refineries and fertilizer plants, were planned for completion in the next two months. Some seventy facilities for baseline inspections in the biological area had been identified and

protocols would be prepared within the same time-frame. In the nuclear area, the IAEA indicated that the system for environmental monitoring was now well established and anticipated its ongoing development. Having received from Iraq the supplementary information required under the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, the IAEA is in the possession of adequate information to support its monitoring activities. The Commission and the IAEA indicated that the plans for the installation of sensors in all of the foregoing areas were well advanced and procurement of additional equipment was under way. The Baghdad Centre for ongoing monitoring and verification should be provisionally operational in the course of September 1994. It is the objective of the Commission and the IAEA to have the monitoring system operational in September 1994.

5. The Iraqi delegation stressed the view that it has completed on its part all actions contemplated in the relevant provisions of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and that, consequently, the Security Council should immediately apply paragraph 22 of the said resolution without any restrictions or further conditions.

6. The Special Commission and the IAEA noted with appreciation the constructive cooperation received from Iraq and the efforts made by the competent Iraqi authorities in the conduct of their tasks. The Commission, the IAEA and Iraq agreed to continue the dialogue to further the carrying out of the objectives of the relevant provisions of the Security Council's resolutions.

5 July 1994
Baghdad